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ON LAW AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY
Daan Braveman•
Richard E. D. "Red" Schwartz has been a colleague and mentor for
over a quarter of a century, and it is with great pleasure that I participate
in this celebration of him and his work. The theme of the conference is
most appropriate for the celebration. Red has devoted his career to an
examination of the role of law in the development of societies.
Moreover, Red's work on law and society has reached far beyond his
extraordinary academic and scholarly achievements, extending as well
to his important and significant contributions to the improvement of
local, national, and international communities. Many years ago, Red
organized a lunchtime reading group at the University to discuss the
meaning of a "just society." It is most fair to say that Red has devoted
his life not only to an academic understanding of such a society, but
also to practical efforts to establish that society.
I was asked to comment on the topic of the conference as it relates
to the United States. It is not simply my law background that persuaded
me to focus on the issue of judicial supremacy. Examination of law and
democracy in the United States at some point must tum its attention to
the role of the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, in furthering
democratic principles. A fundamental · aspect of our democratic
experience has been the institution of judicial review, the proposition
that unelected, life-tenured judges have the power to declare that our
elected representatives have acted unconstitutionally. 1 This is a
remarkable power even if perhaps tempered by the fact that the
judiciary lacks the power of the purse or the sword and, thus, cannot
enforce its decisions. 2
What role should the judiciary and the countermajoritarian
institution of judicial review play in a democracy? Must we (the
people) and our elected representatives comply with a judicial
interpretation of the constitution that we believe is itself inconsistent
with the fundamental law? Or, are we free to ignore judicial decisions
•President, Nazareth College, Rochester, New York, formerly Professor of Law, Syracuse
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1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137, 177-78 (1803).
2. See DAAN BRA VEMAN, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LA w: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN
OUR FEDERAL SYSTEMS 168 (4th ed. 2000) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton)); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 69-70 (1962).
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that we believe are illegitimate? These, of course, are not new questions
but ones that have been debated over the course of our history. In this
brief commentary, I can only introduce some of the issues surrounding
the current debate over these questions.
To place the matter in context, consider the following problem. In
1989, the Supreme Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky that the state did
not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment by executing juveniles. 3 Only 16 years later, a closely
divided Supreme Court reversed that decision and held in Roper v.
Simmons that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from imposing
the death penalty on a juvenile offender under the age of 18 years. 4 The
Roper case involved the state of Missouri and, under preclusion rules,
the judgment did not apply to the other 19 states that authorize the
juvenile death penalty. 5 Suppose the other states maintain that the
earlier decision in Stanford more accurately interpreted the constitution.
Are these other states free to execute juveniles until a court rules that
their laws are unconstitutional, or are they bound by Roper to stop the
practice?
Recently, these kinds of questions are receiving considerable
attention as a number of scholars advocate some version of the idea of
"popular constitutionalism."6 Professor Larry Kramer, author of The
People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review,
defines popular constitutionalism as a system in which the people have
"active and ongoing control over the interpretation and enforcement of
constitutional law." 7 Under this system, the "authority to interpret and
enforce the Constitution is not deposited exclusively or ultimately in the
courts (or in any agency of government, for that matter), but remains in
politics and with 'the people themselves. "'8 In contrast, judicial
supremacy, or what Kramer refers to as "legal constitutionalism," places
final authority to interpret and enforce the Constitution in the judiciary.9
One of the strongest statements of judicial supremacy is the

3. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
4. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
5. As a general proposition, preclusion rules can apply only against a party to a prior
proceeding. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971).
6. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959 (2004) (reviewing
the extensive scholarly literature on the questions raised in this article).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 961 n.3.
9. Id. at 959. See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
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Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Aaron. Io There, Arkansas
officials urged that the Court uphold a suspension of the Little Rock
School Board's plan to desegregate the public schools while state
officials pursued efforts to ignore and nullify the holding in Brown v.
Board of Education. II The Court in Cooper described the case as
involving "a claim by a Governor and Legislature of a State that there is
no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this
Court's considered interpretation of the United States Constitution."I 2 A
unanimous Court forcefully rejected any suggestion that state officials
are free to ignore the decisions of the Supreme Court and engage in
such a "war against the Constitution."I 3 The Court held that when state
officials take an oath to support the Constitution, they bind themselves
to the Court's interpretations of the Constitution. I4 Quoting Chief
Justice Marshall, the Court said: '"If the legislatures of the several states
may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and
destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself
becomes a solemn mockery. rnIS
Arkansas was not one of the states involved in Brown and was not
bound by the judgment in that case under preclusion rules.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the Arkansas officials were
bound in a deeper sense by Brown, reasoning as follows: (1) under the
Supremacy Clause, I6 the Constitution is the supreme law of the land; (2)
Marbury declared that it is the duty of the judiciary to interpret the
Constitution;I 7 (3) therefore, the judiciary's interpretations of the
Constitution are the supreme law of the land as well and bind officials
who are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Is Justice Frankfurter
explained in his concurring opinion that any other conclusion would
destroy the rule of law.
[T]he Founders knew that Law alone saves a society from being rent
by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power however
disguised .... The conception of a government by laws dominated the
thoughts of those who founded this Nation and designed its
10. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
12. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
15. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 115, 136 (1809)).
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
18. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
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Constitution, although they knew as well as the belittlers of the
conception that laws have to be made, interpreted and enforced by
men. To that end, they set apart a body of men, who were to be the
depositories of law, who by their disciplined training and character
and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of private interest may
reasonably be expected to be 'as free, impartial, and independent as
the lot of humanity will admit.' So strongly were the framers of the
Constitution bent on securing a reign of law that they endowed the
judicial office with extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no
matter how exalted his public office or how righteous his private
motive, can be judge in his own case. That is what courts are for. 19

Thirty years later, Attorney General Edwin Meese gave a speech
that attacked Cooper's reliance on the notion of judicial supremacy. In
his controversial remarks, he too invoked the rule of law, but used it to
support the proposition that the supreme law of the land is the
Constitution itself, rather than the constitutional law announced in
Supreme Court interpretations of the document.
Obviously constitutional decisions are binding on the parties to a case;
but the implication of the [Cooper] dictum that everyone should accept
constitutional decisions uncritically, that they are judgments from
which there is no appeal, was astonishing .... In one fell swoop, the
Court seemed to reduce the Constitution to the status of ordinary
constitutional law, and to equate the judge with the lawgiver.... The
logic of the dictum in Cooper v. Aaron was, and is, at war with the
Constitution, at war with the basic principles of democratic
government, and at war with the very meaning of the rule oflaw ....
Perhaps no one has ever put it better than did Abraham Lincoln,
seeking to keep the lamp of freedom burning bright in the dark moral
shadows cast by the Court in the Dred Scott case. Recognizing that
Justice Taney, in his opinion in that case, had done great violence not
only to the text of the Constitution but to the intentions of those who
had written, proposed, and ratified it, Lincoln argued that if the policy
of government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court the instant they
are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions,
the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that
extent, practically resigned their government into the hands of that

19. United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 308-09 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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imminent tribunal. 20

Meese concluded that we must preserve the distinction between the
Constitution and judicial interpretations of the Constitution, recognizing
that it is the former that is superior. Meese warned that "[t]o do
otherwise, as Lincoln said, is to submit to government by judiciary. But
such a state could never be consistent with the principles of our
Constitution. Indeed, it would be utterly inconsistent with the very idea
of the rule of law to which we, as a people, have always subscribed."21
As might be expected, Meese's position provoked sharp criticisms. 22
Anthony Lewis summarized the view of the critics when he wrote, '"To
argue ... that no one owes respect to a Supreme Court decision unless
he was actually a party to the case-is to invite anarchy. "'23 It is
interesting to note that Meese eventually retreated from his position,
explaining that he did not mean to suggest that Supreme Court decisions
are not generally applicable. 24
The current proponents of popular constitutionalism, however,
have refocused attention on the issue and appear to join Meese in
challenging the notion of judicial supremacy. It makes for strange
bedfellows as the political progressives of today advocate views similar
to those of the politically conservative Meese. It may be tempting to
conclude that the debate between advocates of popular constitutionalism
and those of judicial supremacy is not about deep theory but rather
about outcomes. If you like the Supreme Court decisions, you argue for
judicial supremacy. If you disagree with the Court's outcomes, you
argue against the proposition that the Court's decisions have a general
applicability outside the specific parties to the case. Such a conclusion,
however, is not fair to any of the participants in the debate.
Kramer critiques each of the classic justifications for judicial
supremacy and concludes that the arguments rest on controversial
empirical assumptions and facts that can not be tested or proved. 25 He
agrees with others who maintain that ultimately the differences between
the popular constitutionalists and the judicial supremacists tum on
fundamental views about democracy. Underlying the judicial

20. Edwin Meese, Perspective on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decision:
The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 987-89 (1987).
21. Id. at 989.
22. See DAAN BRA VEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 50.
23. Id.
24. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 964.
25. Id. at 1002.
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supremacy model, he argues, is a distrust of democracy, a view that
"ordinary politics is too dangerous to permit without some independent
body to control its excesses and injustices."26 He concludes that:
the choice between popular constitutionalism and judicial
supremacy . . . is necessarily and unavoidably one for the American
people to make. The Constitution does not make the choice for us.
Neither does history or tradition or law. We may choose ... to
surrender control to the Court, to make it our platonic guardian for
defining constitutional values. Or we may choose to keep this
responsibility, even while leavin9 the Court as our agent to make
decisions. Either way, we decide. 2

Critics have attacked Kramers' brand of popular constitutionalism
and his notion that Supreme Court decisions should be binding on only
the parties to the cases. Laurence Tribe, for example, argues that
Kramer's reliance on history is misplaced, finding that "Kramer's
picture of popular constitutionalism from the founding to the mid-20th
century is as misleading as it is foreshortened." 28 More significantly, the
view that the constitution means whatever the "people" say at any given
time ignores the very purposes of a constitution. Tribe wrote:
if constitutional law were but a vessel into which the people could
pour whatever they wanted it to contain at any given moment,
wouldn't the whole point of framing a constitution have been lost? A
constitution announces the "promises to keep" that define who we are.
"The people" whose promises a written constitution makes cannot be
29
frozen in a snapshot-much less a snapshot taken today.

Erwin Chemerinsky offers additional criticisms of popular
constitutionalism. First, he maintains that Kramer relies on arguments
that are abstract at best, failing to explain what he means when he says
that final constitutional interpretative authority lies with the people. 30
Second, and perhaps more significantly, Chemerinsky suggests that

26. Id. at 1004.
27. Id. at 1011.
28. Laurence H. Tribe, The People's Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, § 7.
29. Id.
30. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer,
92 CAL. L. REv. 1013, 1014-18 (2004). See also Larry Alexander & Lawrence Solum,
Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1616 (2005).
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Kramer's version of popular constitutionalism is dangerous because it
leaves protection of minority interests to the whim of the majority. The
absence of judicial supremacy forecloses "judicial protection for
litigants who have nowhere to turn but the courts-litigants who are, by
definition, unable to harness 'popular' authority for their own
constitutional interests. " 31
For our discussion today, I want to suggest that the division
between popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy may be
overstated. There is a substantial role for the "people" even under a
judicial supremacy model that recognizes the binding impact of
Supreme Court decisions beyond the parties to the case. 32 Acting
through their political representatives, the people, of course, can amend
The
the Constitution to reject a Supreme Court interpretation.
amendment process may be appropriately burdensome but it
nevertheless is an available means for expressing the will of the
people. 33 So too, the politically responsive branches can use the
appointment process to alter the composition of the Court, thereby
producing changes in constitutional interpretations.
The people also exercise indirect, but quite effective, influence on
the Court. As others have argued, the empirical data indicate that the
Court is attuned to public opinion and its decisions are usually
consistent with strong majorities. 34 Moreover, the Court uses selfrestraint to avoid deciding issues that, for the time, are better left to the
political branches for resolution. As Professor Bickel noted, the Court
can-and does-deny certiorari and invokes doctrines like standing,
ripeness, and political question as ways to postpone decision on
politically controversial issues. 35
Perhaps most important, however, when the Supreme Court
renders a decision on a politically sensitive issue it does not necessarily

31. Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 1014.
32. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism,
and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004) ("we do not understand judicial
supremacy and popular constitutionalism to be mutually exclusive systems of constitutional
ordering .... They are in fact dialectically interconnected and have long coexisted.").
33. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI (rejecting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793) holding States could be compelled to defend themselves in the courts of the
United States); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); For arguments that the people can
amend the Constitution outside the Article V process, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
( 1991 ); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
34. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 970 n. 42 (listing the articles cited by the author).
35. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 132-33.
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end the ongoing discussion about that issue. Indeed, to the contrary, the
decision is better perceived as generating a dialogue with the political
branches of government and the people. That dialogue, observed
Herbert Wechsler, "concerns the adequacy of the reasons it advances for
the value choices that it decrees." 36 Louis Fisher and Neal Devins
stressed the importance of this ongoing dialogue and the role of the
other branches of government in constitutional interpretation when they
wrote:
Constitutions draw their life from a variety of sources that operate
outside the courts: ideas, customs, social pressures, and the constant
dialogue that takes place among political institutions. Just as the
judiciary leaves its mark on society, so does society drive the agenda
and decisions of the courts. Justice Cardozo reminded us that the
'great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not tum aside
in their course and pass the judges by. ' 37

The decision in Roe v. Wade, for example, plainly was not the final
pronouncement on the abortion issue. 38 Even assuming nonparties were
subject to the precise holding of Roe, there was plenty of room for
continued opposition by arguing that Roe did not address a variety of
specific issues. The people of Connecticut expressed their opposition to
Roe v. Wade by authorizing Medicaid reimbursement for medical
expenses incidental to childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions.
The Supreme Court upheld the state law, concluding that Roe v. Wade
did not prevent the state from making a value judgment that favors
childbirth over abortion. 39 While the funding decision had a profound
practical impact on the ability of the poor to exercise their right under
Roe, the Court found that the State might influence a woman's decision
by making childbirth a more attractive alternative. Similarly, the Court
subsequently upheld the federal government's decision to deny public
funding for medically necessary abortions. 40 In doing so, it observed
that "[w ]hether freedom of choice that is constitutionally protected
36. Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1013
(1965).
37. LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
(2d ed. 1996) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168
(1921)).
38. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185,
1199 (1992).
39. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
40. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer, not
a matter if constitutional entitlement."41
States also responded by imposing a number of restrictions
designed to limit the availability of abortions. In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 42 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the core principle of Roe. At the
same time, however, it upheld the state restrictions on the right,
including a requirement that a minor obtain parental or guardian
approval for an abortion. It also upheld the state's mandate that at least
24 hours before performing an abortion a doctor inform a patient of the
health risks of an abortion, the nature of the procedure, the age of the
fetus, and the availability of material regarding medical assistance for
childbirth.
It might be argued that Chief Justice Rehnquist was correct when
he observed that the Court retained the "outer shell of Roe, but beat[] a
wholesale retreat from the substance of that case."43 The point here,
however, is not to examine the continuing vitality of Roe but to
illustrate the effect of the ongoing dialogue about the abortion issue. 44
Justice (then Judge) Ginsburg captured the significance of such a
dialogue when she stressed that judges are not alone in shaping legal
doctrine but rather "participate in a dialo&ue with the other organs of
government, and with the people as well. " 4
If viewed in this manner, the judicial supremacists and the popular
constitutionalists might not be as split as the rhetoric suggests. A
Supreme Court interpretation might well be treated as binding on
officials sworn to uphold the Constitution, even if they are not parties to
the specific case. At the same time, however, that decision does not
prevent an ongoing dialogue about the wisdom of the interpretation, a
dialogue that recognizes the role of the people and the political branches
and one that could lead to a change in the very constitutional
determination.

41. Id. at318.
42. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
43. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
44. The abortion controversy is just one of the many examples of such a dialogue
among the Court, the political branches, and the people. Other prominent examples include
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
45. Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 1198.
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